Este artículo es un esfuerzo por llevar a cabo un ejercicio filosófico en un doble direccionamiento: de un lado, se asiste a la teorización y, de otro, se participa en la experiencia; niveles de lo idéntico. A partir de acá, se ponen en liza dos vías para llegar a un mismo espacio de florecimiento; los bordes por los que cercamos el sentido profundo del ser. Para eso, tomamos el valor poético que emerge de la obra del poeta argentino Hugo Mujica. (...) Allí se encontrarán elementos suficientes de análisis filosófico, especialmente en la obra de Heidegger y Lévinas, para después, no sólo acompañar sino acontecer en la experiencia propia la interpretación posible a lo profundo de su poesía. El método será el hermenéutico existencial, centrando lo hermenéutico en la contextualización e interpretación de la obra escrita, y lo existencial en el momento de interpretar poemas. El logro a resaltar es el haber explicitado lo ontológico en los textos líricos de Mujica. (shrink)

El presente artículo indaga si ¿es el sujeto un ser autónomo en la deliberación política o sonlos pensamientos, las posturas y las formas de la organización política mediadas por las distintas herramientas comunicacionales a las que se ve expuesto quienes lo determinan? Así, analiza larelación que existe entre mass media y política, con la capacidad deliberativa del individuo altomar decisiones en el contexto político, a partir de Chomsky y Han. La metodología es cualitativa con diseño documental, el instrumento son fichas (...) bibliográficas aplicadas a fuentes primarias y secundarias. Se usan bases de datos con el algoritmo: “Neoliberalismo, psicopolítica, big data, medios de comunicación de masas y democracia”. Se analizan 13 libros y 20 artículos. Se identifican las nuevas formas y herramientas de organización política y la relación entre política y medios de comunicación. Se concluye que: 1) el neoliberalismo direcciona la idea de libre mercado hacia el individuo mismo, 2) es necesaria una ciudadanía crítica que tenga un rol más activo en lademocracia, 3) se identifica a la psicopolítica como una nueva forma de organización política, 4) lanueva herramienta de la política es el big data, 5) se evidencia que la relación entre política y massmedia está vinculada con los grupos de poder y 6) la emocionalización de la comunicación políticadisminuye la autonomía individual. (shrink)

In this paper we look at business ethics from a deontological perspective. We address the theory of ethical decision-making and deontological ethics for business executives and explore the concept of “moral duty” as transcending mere gain and profit maximization. Two real-world cases that focus on accounting fraud as the ethical conception. Through these cases, we show that while accounting fraud – from a consequentialist perspective – may appear to provide a quick solution to a pressing problem, longer term effects of (...) fraud and misconduct make ethical implications more apparent. Widely used compensation schemes also may have the tendency to fuel unethical behavior. We argue that an ethical reinvigoration of the business world can only be accomplished by encouraging the business realm to impose upon itself some measure of self-regulating along the lines of deontological ethics. Principles of deontology should guide executive decision-making particularly when executives are tempted to operate outside of codified legislation or are bound to act under judicial-free conditions. (shrink)

Behaviorism is consistent with the assumptions of perfect competition, with the homo economicus model, and with a form of ethics that enshrines market-based notions of utility, justice, and rights and encourages rational maximizing. Economics and business courses foster this deficient form of ethics, assuming an overriding desire for money, which, according to MacIntyre and Aristotle, crowds out the associative virtues. These beliefs, often associated with Taylor and Friedman, lead to such practices as incentive compensation, which would be effective only if (...) employees were homines economici and thus rational in the sense of knowing how to satisfy whatever desires they have. Against Davidson’s view that psychology cannot be a natural science, Aristotle believes that there can be a teleological, if not exact, science of behavior. Aristotle believes that emotions and objectives may be rational or irrational. But rationality—phronesis, practical wisdom—is not a matter of applying algorithms. Doris questions whether character generates the first premises of an agent’s practical syllogisms, while Haidt has argued that we often act on emotions rather than on the basis of the reasons that we claim motivate us. Aristotle agrees that many people are not virtuous and that weakness of the will is a common occurrence, and he agrees that emotion drives actions. But if you are virtuous, your emotions and desires support your rationality. Aristotle gives us reason to reject the notion that people are homines economici and to treat them as rational deliberators, in part by creating an appropriate culture. The claim that it is in the nature of human beings to deliberate rationally is in part aspirational, but also in part scientific—in Aristotle’s modest sense. (shrink)

In his recently published book Animals and African Ethics, Kai Horsthemke makes two important and related claims. The first is that most African metaphysical, religious, and ethical positions and perspectives on animals are anthropocentric. Second, he states that if there are one or more principles of duties regarding other animals derivable from these positions and perspectives, they are at best “indirect duties.” In this article, I critically engage with these claims in the context of the ontological beliefs and ethical standpoints (...) that flow from anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. I argue that the African metaphysical worldview and African practices on animals are not anthropocentric. The nub of my argument is that a closer examination of African practices on animals and one dominant African metaphysical worldview—one that Horsthemke engages with in the book—presents us a different conclusion, one that suggests that the worldview and practices are conceivably biocentric or ecocentric rather than anthropocentric. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Ubuntu can be construed as a strict form of cosmopolitan moral and political theory. The implication of this is that the duty or obligation that humans owe other humans arises in virtue of humanity or the notion of human-ness. That is, one is a person insofar as he or she forms humane relations and it is this particular way of beingness that makes every person both an object and subject of duty. On this cosmopolitan (...) interpretation of Ubuntu, I therefore, argue that Ubuntu would support the principle of natural resource redistribution according to which all humans fall within the scope of justice and the principles of distributive justice. If this is right, then Ubuntu’s cosmopolitanism has something to contribute generally to cosmopolitanism, as an account of global justice. (shrink)

In cognitive neuroscience, functional magnetic resonance imaging is used to produce images of brain functions. These images play a central role in the practice of neuroscience. In this paper we are interested in how these brain images become understandable and meaningful for scientists. In order to explore this problem we observe how scientists use such semiotic resources as gesture, language, and material structure present in the socially and culturally constituted environment. A micro-analysis of video records of scientists interacting with each (...) other and with fMRI images reveals action as cognition, that is, actions that constitute thinking for the scientists. (shrink)

Nietzche claimed that once we know why to live, we’ll suffer almost any how.1 Artificial intelligence (AI) is used widely for the how, but Ferrario et al now advocate using AI for the why.2 Here, I offer my doubts on practical grounds but foremost on ethical ones. Practically, individuals already vacillate over the why, wavering with time and circumstance. That AI could provide prosthetics (or orthotics) for human agency feels unrealistic here, not least because ‘answers’ would be largely unverifiable. Ethically, (...) the concern is that AI stands to frack our humanity. We form a fragile ecosystem of ethical subjects, our responsiveness to others’ suffering, enabled by our own. To deliberate together for incapacitated others is among those solemn privileges that verify our humanity. Having AI mine these delicate pain-forests risks treating our suffering as the new oil—to be extracted and exploited, but beyond our vision and at our cost. Let’s briefly develop each idea, starting with the how/why distinction. This is palpable, even for more prosaic questions like how or why to drive. The former admits of increasingly sophisticated technological fixes and nudge; the latter often remains very particular and personal. How much greater then, the difference between …. (shrink)

Christopher McMahon links political theory and business ethics and thereby takes the latter to a new level of philosophical sophistication. McMahon argues that legitimate authority, political or managerial, characteristically preempts certain of one’s judgments, so that one may reasonably submit to a directive to do something that contravenes one’s principles. Authoritative preemption does not involve weighing reasons pro and con, as one who is considering breaking a promise must do: it disqualifies competing considerations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:460 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY accurate understanding of the mind of Aristotle. Nifo's shift on the question of Aristotle and immortality thus represents a noteworthy chapter in the history of Renaissance Aristotelianism.6x EDWAKDP. MAHONEY Duke University 6x I should like to thank the United States Government for a Fulbright fellowship during 1962-1963; the National Foundation for the Humanities for a fellowship during 1968-1969; and the Duke UniversityResearch Council for grants (...) for microfilms. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF JACOB LOEWENBERG Compiled by Edwin S. Budge It is hoped that all of Professor Loewenberg's published writings, exclusive of his many book reviews, are listed herein. His unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Genesis of Hegel's Dialectical Method" (1911), is available on loan from Harvard University, although the "gist" of this, as Dr. Loewenberg has indicated, may be found in the introduction to the first item cited in the bibliography. Dr. Loewenberg, it might be added, also translated a short work by Gilbert Chinard, France for the Soldier (Berkeley: University of California, 1918), and quite likely was consulted by his wife Kate in the course of her translation of Emile Meyerson's Identity and Reality (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930; reprinted by Dover, 1962, and Peter Smith, 1963). Jacob Loewenberg's personal papers are in the possession of his daughter, Mrs. Jeannot Nyles, of Berkeley, California. 1912 1916 BIBLIOGRAPHYOF THE WRITINGSOF JACOBLOEWENBERG "Vorwort," pp. v-vi; "Einleitung: 'Die jugendlichen Denkversuche Hegels'," pp. vii-xxii; in Hegels Entwiir/e zur Enzyklopiidie und Propiideutik nach den Handschri/ten der Harvard-Universitiit. Mit einer Handschri[tprobe. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Herausgegeben yon Dr. J. Ltwenberg. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, I912. xxiv, 59 pp. (Hegel-Archiv. Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson. Band I, Heft 1.) "Interpretation as a Self-Representative Process," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (May, 1916), 420-423. "Mysticism and Idealism," University o/ California Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (January, 1916), 72-91. "An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, December 10, 1915." 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 461 "The Spirit of Hegel's Philosophy," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (July, 1916), 373-393. "The Teachings of Royce," The California Alumni Fortnightly, Vol. IX, No. 14 (September 30, 1916), 216-217. "Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato," The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. X, No. 3 (July, 1917), 215-236. "An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 23, 1917." "Josiah Royce: Interpreter of American Problems," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (January, 1917), 39-47. "The Prophetic Songs of Swinburne," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XX, No. 10anuary, 1918), 106-115. "Preface," pp. vii-xii in Lectures on Modern Idealism. By Josiah Royce. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. Pp. 259. (Semicentennial Publications of the University of California, 1868-1918.) "Ethics and the War," Mills Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 4 0anuary, 1919), 6-9. "An address delivered at Mills College, October 18, 1918." "Multiplicity and the Social Order," The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XII, No. 2 (April, 1919), 137-164. "President Wilson's Americanism," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January, 1919), 1-15. "Introduction," pp. 3-37 in Fugitive Essays; with an Introduction by Dr. J. Loewenberg. By Josiah Royce. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Pp. 429. (Semicentennial Publications of the University of California, 1868-1918.) "Philosophy and Humanism," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXIH, No. 3 (July, 1921), 298-318. "Read before the Kosmos Club of the University of California, April 4, 1921." "The Apotheosis of Mind in Modern Idealism," The Philosophical Reviewj Vol. XXXI, No. 3 (May, 1922), 215-236. "A fragment of a larger essay." "The Idea of Mutability in Literature," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (April, 1922), 129-151. "The Metaphysics of Critical Realism," pp. 167-194 in Issues and Tendencies in Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by George P. Adams and J. Loewenberg. 462 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Berkeley: University of California, 1923, Pp. 224. (University of California Publieations in Philosophy, VoL IV.) Read before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, March 30, 1923. "'The Metaphysics of Modern Scepticism," The Philosophical... (shrink)

The thirteen essays in this Modern Library edition comprise a complete survey of the golden age of English philosophy. The anthology begins in the early seventeenth century with Francis Bacon's comprehensive program for the total reorganization of all knowledge; it culminates, some two hundred and fifty years later, with John Stuart Mill. The thinkers represented here are the creators of the twentieth-century world. Indebted to them is a long line of economists, sociologists, and political leaders whose work has profoundly influenced (...) the life and thought of our own time. Included are the excerpts from Francis Bacon's The Great Instauration , Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan , Jeremy Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation , and John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding . The complete texts are provided for Locke's second "Treatise of Government", George Berkeley's "Treatise Concerning the Principle's of Human Knowledge", David Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" and "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion", John Gay's "Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality", James Mill's "Government", and John Stuart Mill's "Utilitarianism" and "On Liberty". With an introduction as well as nine biographical prefaces by Edwin A. Burtt. (shrink)

Earlier, we have studied computations possible by physical systems and by algorithms combined with physical systems. In particular, we have analysed the idea of using an experiment as an oracle to an abstract computational device, such as the Turing machine. The theory of composite machines of this kind can be used to understand (a) a Turing machine receiving extra computational power from a physical process, or (b) an experimenter modelled as a Turing machine performing a test of a known physical (...) theory T.Our earlier work was based upon experiments in Newtonian mechanics. Here we extend the scope of the theory of experimental oracles beyond Newtonian mechanics to electrical theory. First, we specify an experiment that measures resistance using a Wheatstone bridge and start to classify the computational power of this experimental oracle using non-uniform complexity classes. Secondly, we show that modelling an experimenter and experimental procedure algorithmically imposes a limit on our ability to measure resistance by the Wheatstone bridge.The connection between the algorithm and physical test is mediated by a protocol controlling each query, especially the physical time taken by the experimenter. In our studies we find that physical experiments have an exponential time protocol; this we formulate as a general conjecture. Our theory proposes that measurability in Physics is subject to laws which are co-lateral effects of the limits of computability and computational complexity. (shrink)

We have begun a theory of measurement in which an experimenter and his or her experimental procedure are modeled by algorithms that interact with physical equipment through a simple abstract interface. The theory is based upon using models of physical equipment as oracles to Turing machines. This allows us to investigate the computability and computational complexity of measurement processes. We examine eight different experiments that make measurements and, by introducing the idea of an observable indicator, we identify three distinct forms (...) of measurement process and three types of measurement algorithm. We give axiomatic specifications of three forms of interfaces that enable the three types of experiment to be used as oracles to Turing machines, and lemmas that help certify an experiment satisfies the axiomatic specifications. For experiments that satisfy our axiomatic specifications, we give lower bounds on the computational power of Turing machines in polynomial time using nonuniform complexity classes. These lower bounds break the barrier defined by the Church-Turing Thesis. (shrink)

Since its inception, experimental social psychology has arguably been of two minds about the nature and role of theory. Contemporary social psychology's experimental approach has been strongly informed by the “nomological-deductive” approach of Carl Hempel in tandem with the “hypothetico-deducive” approach of Karl Popper. Social psychology's commitment to this hybrid model of science has produced at least two serious obstacles to more fruitful theorizing about human experience: the problem of situational specificity, and the manifest impossibility of formulating meaningful general laws (...) of human social behavior. It is argued that a social psychology based on the search for this kind of lawfulness, under the auspices of either a strict or loose interpretation of the largely Hempelian model, is ultimately unworkable. An alternative approach to social psychology that is attentive both to the need for understanding individual situations and behaviors and to the need for generalized understanding of actual human behaviors is offered. This approach is grounded in the hermeneutic tradition. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Metaphysics and Epistemology Political Philosophy Conclusion.

Parity of esteemdescribes an aspiration to see mental health valued as much as physical. Proponents point to poorer funding of mental health services, greater stigma and poorer physical health for those with mental illness. Stubborn persistence of such disparities suggests a need to do more than stipulate ethical and legal obligations toward justice or fairness. Here, I propose that we should rely more on our legal obligations toward informed consent. The latter requires clinicians to disclose information about risks in a (...) way that is sufficient to satisfy what a prudent patient would reasonably want to understand in their circumstances. I argue that inadequate disclosure of the mental health complications of common surgeries risks exposing the craft specialists performing them to clinical negligence claims. Patients could argue they were counselled about said risks, improperly or not at all: improperly, if advised by a craft specialist lacking sufficient expertise in mental health; not at all, if mental health complications were simply forgotten. From this, I argue that a prudent approach for craft specialists would be to support and fund ‘integrative’ specialists (from rehabilitation medicine, liaison psychiatry and health psychology), more often to work alongside them within a multidisciplinary team that is better placed to navigate consent (via a prehabilitation process, for example). Based on duties toward consent, the extension of this type of coworking is another way to improve the resource and understanding accorded to mental health—but by starting within the citadels of physical health. (shrink)

If “on what matters” captures Parfit’s search for objective moral truths (Parfit 2011), perhaps “on who matters (and why)” might be a working title for Shepherd’s enquiry into the moral status of n...

Aristotelian naturalism is a good vantage point from which to consider the moral implications of evolution. Sociobiologists err in arguing that evolution is the basis for morality: not all or only moral features and institutions are selected for. Nor does the longevity of an institution argue for its moral status. On the other hand, facts about human capacities can have implications concerning human obligations, as Aristotle suggests. Aristotle’s eudaimonistic approach to ethics suggests that the notion of interests is far subtler (...) than many have realized, and leaves open the possibility that cooperativeness may be adaptive, virtuous, and a good thing for the agent. Lawrence and Nohria argue along remarkably similar lines, and they provide evidence against those who would question the existence of character. But promising as the Aristotelian approach is, it seems to give an inadequate account of our moral responsibility to those who are not members of our community. (shrink)